One of the key texts in the battle against scientific pretensions, is Paul Feyerabend's 1975 polemic Against Method, a book subtitled as 'an outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge'. We capture its style and essence here through some quotations.
Science as a myth
"Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy and impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted it without having ever examined its advantages and its limits." [p15]
Against 'rules'
"The history of science, after all, does not just consist of fact and conclusions drawn from fact. It also contains ideas, interpretations of facts, problems created by conflicting interpretations, mistakes and so on. On closer analysis we even find that science knows no ‘bare facts’ at all but that the ‘facts’ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the minds of those who invented them. Conversely, a little brainwashing will go a long way in making the history of science duller, simpler, more uniform, more ‘objective’ and more easily accessible to treatment by strict and unchangeable rules." [p19]
..".events and developments, such as the atomism in antiquity, the Copernican Revolution, the rise of modern atomism (kinetic theory, dispersion theory stereo chemistry, quantum theory), the gradual emergence of the wave theory of light, occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain ‘obvious’ methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them.... given any rule, however ‘fundamental’ or ‘necessary’ for science, there are always circumstances when it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite." [p23]
"...science is never a completed process, therefore it is always ‘before’ the event. Hence simplicity, elegance or consistency are never necessary conditions of (scientific) practice." [p24]
"The consistency condition goes back to Aristotle at least. It plays an important part in Newton’s philosophy (although Newton himself constantly violated it). It is taken for granted by the majority of 20th century philosophers of science."
“ad hoc approximations conceal and even entirely eliminate, qualitative difficulties. they create a false impression of the excellence of our science.” [p64] Theories like quantum theory have become “a veritable monster of rigour and precision while its relation to experience is more obscure than ever”.
“The demand to admit only those theories which are consistent with the available and accepted facts again leaves us without any theory... Not only are facts and theories in constant disharmony, they are never as neatly separated as everyone makes them out to be. Methodological rules speak of ‘theories’, ‘observations’ and ‘experimental results’ as if these were clear-cut well-defined objects whose properties are easy to evaluate and which are understood in the same way by all sciences.” Copernican hypotheses failed the evidence and ran “”counter to almost every methodological rule that one might care to think of today”. [p67]
In favour of diversity of opinion
"Popular science books (and this includes many books on the philosophy of science) spread the basic postulates fo the theory; applications are made in distant fields, money is given to the orthodox, and withheld from the rebels. More than ever the theory seems to possess tremendous empirical support. The chances for alternatives are now every slight indeed." [p43]
Against pseudo-science and grand theories ('Global Warming', today might be such an example)
" ... empirical evidence may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced. At this point, an ‘empirical theory’ of the kind described (and let us always remember that the basic principles of the present quantum theory, and especially the idea of complementarity, are uncomfortably close to forming such a theory) becomes almost indistinguishable from a second-rate myth. In order to realise this, we need only consider a myth such as the myth of witchcraft and of demonic possession that was developed by Roman Catholic theologians and that dominated the 15th-16th-and-17th-century thought on the European continent. This myth is a complex explanatory system that contains numerous auxiliary hypotheses designed to cover special cases, as it easily achieves a high degree of confirmation on the basis of observation. It has been taught for a long time; its content is enforced by fear, prejudice and ignorance, as well as by a jealous and cruel priesthood. Its ideas penetrate the most common idiom, infect all modes of thinking and many decisions which mean a great deal in human life."
"Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a church, for the frightened or greedy victims of some (ancient or modern) myth, or for the weak and willing followers of some tyrant. Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook." [p46]
For alternative histories of science
[Pythagoras said that the earth moved, Ptolomy and Aristotle that it did not. Copernicus revived an ancient myth. Much astronomical knowledge is contained in the forms of ancient myths and legends.]
“The special theory of relativity was retained despite Kaufmann’s unambiguous experimental results of 1906 and despite D. C. Miler’s refutation (... from the point of view of contemporary evidence...). The general theory of relativity, though surprisingly successful in some domains, failed to explain 10” in the movements fo the nodes of Venus and 5” in the movements of the nodes of Mars, moreover it is now in trouble due to the new calculations of the movements of Mercury... [56-7] but then Einstein once remarked in a letter (12 May 1952, cited by Feyerabend pp 58-9) “It is really strange that human beings are normally deaf tot he strongest arguments while they are always inclined to overestimate measuring devices.”
"Newton’s celebrated ray theory of light was unable to explain why mirrors worked - why they reflected light despite having, in terms of the supposed length (more precisely, the lateral extension) of the light ray, a very rough surface. Newton was aware of the difficulty for his theory and simply offered that “the reflection of a ray is effected not by a single point of the reflecting body, but by some power of the body which is evenly diffused all over its surface”. [quoted on page 59]
Dangers of allowing the scientists special status
“Scientists are not content with running their own playpens in accordance with what they regard as the rules of scientific method, they want to universalise these rules, they want them to become part of society at large and they use every means at their disposal - argument, propaganda, pressure tactics, intimidation, lobbying - to achieve their aims.” {cf. e.g. quoted approvingly of the Chinese Communists and their use of ancient ideas in reforming health policy] [p220]
“The rise of modern science coincides with the suppression of non-western tribes by Western invaders. The tribes are not only physically suppressed, they also lose their intellectual independence and are forced to adopt the bloodthirsty religion fo brotherly love- Christianity. The more intelligent members get an extra bonus: they are introduced into he mysteries of Western Rationalism and its peak - Western Science. [p299]
"... State and science, however, work closely together. Immense sums are spent on the improvement of scientific ideas. ... Even human relations are dealt with in the scientific manner, as is shown by education programmes, proposals for prison reform, army training and so on. Almost all scientific subjects are compulsory in our schools. While the parents of a six year old can decide to have him instructed in the rudiments of Protestantism... or to omit religious instruction altogether, they do not have a similar freedom in the case of the sciences: Physics , astronomy , history must be learned. they cannot be replaced by magic, astrology, or by a study of legends.” [p301}
Put facts aside...
“Theories are tested, and possibly refuted, by facts. facts contain ideological components, older views which have vanished from sight or were perhaps never formulated in an explicit manner. Such components are highly suspicious. Firstly, because of their age and obscure origin: we do not know why and how they were first introduced; secondly, because their very nature protects them, and has always protected them, from critical examination. In the event of a contradiction between a new and promising theory and a collection of firmly established facts, the best procedure therefore, is not to abandon he theory but to use it to discover the hidden principles responsible of the contradiction. Counterinduction is an essential part of such aa process of discover. (Excellent historical example: the arguments against motion and atomicity of Parmenides and Zeno. ... )” [79]
“developing a good theory is a complex process that has to start modestly and that takes time...It is much better to remain ad hoc for a while... than to sink back into he earlier ideas.” [98]
“Inventing theories and contemplating them in a relaxed and ‘artistic’ fashion, we often make moves that are forbidden by methodological rules. For example, we interpret the evidence so that it fits our fanciful ideas, we estimate difficulties by ad hoc procedures we push them aside, or we simple refuse to take them seriously.” [167]
“A strict principle of falsification... would wipe out science as we know it, and would never have permitted it to start.” [176]
Dangers of common sense reasoning
[On the dangers of common sense reasoning are illustrated by the ‘commons sense’ notions of ‘up and down’.]
“Lactantius, a church father of the fourth century, appeals to this meaning when he asks (Divinae Institutiones III, de False Sapaientia): “Is one really going to be so confused as to assume the existence of humans whose feet are above their heads? Where trees and fruit grow not upwards, but downwards?”
[Thales, Anaximenes and Xenophanes were all perplexed by the problem of what stopped the Earth from ‘falling’. The agreement between this ‘common sense’ view and science a key element of the ‘science’ pressed by Aristotle.] [86]
“Copernicus himself admits (in Commentariolus) that the Ptolomaic theory is ‘consistent with the numerical data’.” [footnote, page 88]
“When the ‘Pythagorean idea’ of the motion of the Earth was revived by Copernicus it met with difficulties which exceed the difficulties encountered by Ptolomaic astronomy. Strictly speaking, one had to regard it as refuted. Galileo, who was convinced of the truth of the Copernican view ... looked for new kinds of fact which might support Copernicus... Such facts he obtained in two ways. First, by the invention of the telescope which changed the sensory core of everyday experience and replaced it with puzzling and unexplained phenomena; and by his principle of relativity and his dynamics which changed its conceptual components. Neither the telescopic phenomena nor the new ideas of motion were acceptable to common sense... [160]
In praise of ‘unreason’
“.. the principles of critical rationalism (take falsifications seriously; increase content, avoid ad hoc hypotheses; be ‘honest’ - whatever that means; and son on) and , a fortiori, the principles of logical empiricism (be precise, base your theories on measurements’ avoid vague and unstable ideas; and so on) give an inadequate account of the past development of science and liable to hinder science in the future ... the attempt to make science more ‘rational’ is bound to wipe it out, as we have seen. [179]
“Without ‘chaos’, no knowledge. Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress... even within science, reason cannot and should not be allowed to be comprehensive and that it must often be overruled, or eliminated, in favour of other agencies.... Given science, reason cannot be universal an unreason cannot be excluded. ...” [pp 179-180]
“While astronomy profited from Pythagoreanism and from the Platonic love for circles,; medicine profited from herbalism, from he psychology, the metaphysics, the physiology of witches, midwives, cunning men, wandering druggists... Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific methods and unscientific results, while procedures which have often been regarded as essential parts of science are quietly suspended or circumvented.” [305]
“Modern science is not as difficult and as perfect as scientific propaganda want us to believe. A subject such as medicine, or physics, or biology appears difficult only because it is taught badly..” [307]
“Thus anarchism is not only possible, it is necessary both of the internal progress of science and for the development of our culture as a whole. And Reason, at last, joins all those abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods... ” [180]
On Astrology
“’In the early stages of the human mind’, writes A. Comte (Cours de Philosophie Positive, Vol. III), 1836) ‘these connecting links between astrology and biology were studies from a very different point of view, but at least they were studied and not left out of sight, as is the common tendency in our won time, under the restricting influence of a nascent and incomplete positivism. Beneath the chimerical belief of the old philosophy in the physiological influence of the stars, there lay a strong, though confused recognition of the truth that the facts of life were in some way dependent on the solar system. Like all primitive inspirations of man’s intelligence this feeling needed rectification by positive science but not destruction...’” [footnote on page 100]
Plato’s Planet Problem
[The problem is that since the heavenly objects are divine, they should behave in an orderly and tidy manner. Some of the brightest objects , the planets, however wander around unpredictably - ‘chaotically’ even. The problem was solved by Eudoxus and Heracleides of Pontos with a new mathematical model.]
Against ‘reason’
“... what our historical examples seem to show is this: there are situations when our most liberal judgements and our most liberal rules would have eliminated an idea or a point of view which we regard today as essential for science... and such situations occur quite frequently. The ideas survived and they can now be said to be in agreement with reason. They survived because prejudice, passion, conceit, errors, sheer pigheadedness, in short because all the elements that characterise the context of discovery, opposed the dictates of reason and because there irrational elements were permitted to have their way. To express it differently: Copernicism and other ‘rational’ views exist today only because reason was overruled at some time in their past.
(The opposite is also true” witchcraft and other ‘irrational’ views have ceased to influential only because reason was overruled at some time in their past). [155]
Observation and theory inseparable
“learning does not go from observation to theory but always involves both elements. Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions not before them, and an experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experience. ... Nobody will deny that the sentences of science can be classified into long sentences and short sentences, or that its statements can be classified into those which are intuitively obvious and others which are not. Nobody will deny such distinctions can be made. But nobody will put great weight on them, or will even mention them for they do not now play and decisive role in the business of science... Does experience play such a role? It does not, as we have seen....
Let us take a step forward and let us abandon this last trace of dogmatism in science! [pp168-9]
